O impacto da corrupção arbitrária e generalizada nos influxos de IDE e o efeito moderador da distância de corrupção: Evidências da América Latina

Daniel Mendes Pessegueiro, Manuel Portugal Ferreira, Nuno Rosa Reis, Cláudia Frias Pinto

Resumo


Não é consensual na literatura a prevalência de um efeito negativo da corrupção sobre a capacidade de atração de investimento direto estrangeiro (IDE). Alguns países têm, simultaneamente, altos níveis de corrupção e de influxos de IDE. Neste estudo distinguimos o efeito de dois tipos de corrupção – arbitrária e generalizada - e o papel moderador da distância da corrupção entre o país investidor e receptor na capacidade de atração de IDE. Num estudo empírico dos influxos de IDE para países da América Latina, os resultados mostram que a corrupção generalizada reduz a atratividade ao investimento estrangeiro e que a distância de corrupção ameniza o efeito negativo da relação entre corrupção arbitrária do país receptor e os influxos de IDE. Este estudo contribui para aprofundar a pesquisa sobre os efeitos da corrupção, em particular quanto ao efeito diferenciado dos tipos de corrupção e dos efeitos da distância de corrupção nos influxos de IDE.

Não é consensual na literatura a prevalência de um efeito negativo da corrupção sobre a capacidade de atração de investimento direto estrangeiro (IDE). Alguns países têm, simultaneamente, altos níveis de corrupção e de influxos de IDE. Neste estudo distinguimos o efeito de dois tipos de corrupção – arbitrária e generalizada - e o papel moderador da distância da corrupção entre o país investidor e receptor na capacidade de atração de IDE. Num estudo empírico dos influxos de IDE para países da América Latina, os resultados mostram que a corrupção generalizada reduz a atratividade ao investimento estrangeiro e que a distância de corrupção ameniza o efeito negativo da relação entre corrupção arbitrária do país receptor e os influxos de IDE. Este estudo contribui para aprofundar a pesquisa sobre os efeitos da corrupção, em particular quanto ao efeito diferenciado dos tipos de corrupção e dos efeitos da distância de corrupção nos influxos de IDE.

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Palavras-chave


Corrupção arbitrária; Corrupção generalizada; Distância da corrupção; Investimento direto estrangeiro; América Latina

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18568/1980-4865.13150-62